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External Adjustment and 
U.S. Macroeconomic 
Performance 
It is generally accepted that the U.S. current account 
deficit poses risks to the economy and that its reduc- 
tion is one of this nation's important policy goals. How 
the process  of external adjustment will affect future 
U.S. economic performance is, however, less clearly 
understood.  Although many observers contend  that 
adjustment may require temporarily slower growth  in 
U.S. living standards, the extent of this and other  eco- 
nomic costs of reducing the current account deficit has 
not been fully examined. 
In this article,  we  seek to analyze the  macro- 
economic implications of U.S. external adjustment. To 
this end, we develop a simulation model of the U.S. 
economy that allows us to identify alternative adjust- 
ment scenarios differing in their projections for future 
policy actions and market behavior. These scenarios 
are assessed according to their  effectiveness in 
achieving  a sustained  reduction in the U.S. current 
account  deficit  and  other important macroeconomic 
objectives. 
In the course of the analysis, we point  to certain spe- 
cific  changes in economic activity that will be required 
along any path that reduces the U.S. current account 
deficit. In particular, the virtual elimination of the U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit, a slowing in domestic 
demand, and a significant rise in the national savings 
rate will all be necessary if adjustment is to take place 
without fueling inflationary pressures or eroding long- 
term growth prospects in the United States. 
We also find that measures increasing world demand 
for U.S. goods cannot be expected, by themselves, to 
provide the major impetus for adjustment. After  several 
years of rapid growth, the U.S. economy is approaching 
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full capacity. Consequently, further reductions  in the 
dollar's real value  or steps to stimulate foreign demand 
growth will likely produce only limited improvement in 
the current  account unless they are accompanied by 
economic changes that slow  the pace of demand in the 
United States. 
These results are supported by our empirical anal- 
ysis. The examination of alternative  adjustment sce- 
narios reveals that the failure to take timely actions to 
reduce the current account deficit poses risks to the 
U.S.  economy. In particular,  external adjustment 
brought about  by financial market reactions  in  the 
absence of active  policy measures could lead  to a 
serious disruption in U.S. and global economic activity. 
Even without such reactions, postponing  the adjust- 
ment process into the 1990s will almost certainly lead 
to a greater cumulative  slowdown in real GNP  and 
domestic demand than would occur if adjustment were 
to begin immediately. 
In contrast,  appropriate  and timely policy actions 
taken by fiscal and monetary authorities can generate 
an adjustment path consistent with overall macro- 
economic stability. Under a  scenario in which fiscal  pol- 
icy contracts  and  monetary authorities  respond 
accordingly, U.S. output can grow at close to its full 
capacity rate of between  21/2  and 3 percent annually 
while domestic demand expands at a rate that is one- 
half of one percentage point  less than that of GNP. 
These rates of expansion require a slowing from  recent 
trends, particularly for demand, but represent paths of 
maximum  sustainable growth consistent with  both 
external adjustment and price stability. 
Our analysis further suggests that foreign economic conditions  play an important  role in determining the 
trade-offs facing the U.S. economy.  Faster foreign 
domestic demand growth  would allow for  more rapid 
U.S. growth  during adjustment.  Moreover, under the 
scenario described above in which domestic  policies 
allow for adjustment with output growth near full capac- 
ity, a temporary  stimulus  to foreign demand, coordi- 
nated with U.S. actions, could reduce the magnitude of 
U.S. policy changes  required  to reduce the current 
account deficit. 
Conceptual discussion 
The U.S. external deficit can be reduced in a variety 
of ways, and the specific factors  inducing adjustment 
will play a key role in determining the path of economic 
activity. Nonetheless, there are constraints common to 
all nations undergoing external adjustment that, when 
viewed in the light of recent U.S. experience, allow us 
to identify changes in activity that will be necessary 
along almost any adjustment path. 
In considering these changes, it is  useful to recall 
three identities that describe a current account imbal- 
ance.1  First, a nation's  current  account deficit, CAD, 
reflects an imbalance in its overall trade position with 
other nations. As identity 1  shows, an external imbal- 
ance  can  be  decomposed into the sum of the trade 
deficit—representing the gap between imports, M, and 
exports, X, of goods and services — and the net invest- 
ment incomes deficit, lIP, which accounts for returns to 
foreigners on their  net holdings of U.S. assets. Sim- 
ilarly, a current  account deficit  reflects an excess  of 
national  spending on goods and services,  DD,  over 
GNP (identity 2). This gap between spending and out- 
put must be bridged by net borrowing from abroad, 
11n presenting the  identities, we ignore the role of  unilateral transfers 
and do not account for differences in measures  of the U.S. external 
account on a Balance of Payments  basis and on a National Income 
and Product Accounts basis. 
meaning that national savings—net private savings, SP, 
plus net savings of the public sector, S9  — is insufficient 
to satisfy  the domestic demand for these savings in the 
form of investment, I (identity 3). 
These  identities  highlight  conditions  necessary  to 
reduce a current account deficit. Imports (or net invest- 
ment income payments) must slow relative to exports 
at the same time that domestic demand slows in rela- 
tion to output and  national  savings  rises relative to 
investment. These identities cannot, of course, deter- 
mine the path of any particular variable over the adjust- 
ment period.  Exports,  output, and savings  could all 
conceivably rise or fall, allowing for a similar variation 
in the path of their counterparts in the identities pre- 
sented above. 
However,  an analysis of recent U.S. experience indi- 
cates changes in these  identities that will likely  take 
place during adjustment.  In particular, the large and 
growing  U.S. debt to foreign countries  has clear-cut 
implications for the  pattern of trade adjustment. The 
U.S. net foreign asset position,  representing  loans, 
securities, and direct investment  claims, has fallen 
sharply during this decade, and our net foreign debt, 
according  to official estimates,  is now approaching 
$500 billion  (Table 1). This accumulation of debt has 
been accompanied by a rising stream of interest and 
dividend payments abroad, reflected in the decline of 
more than $25 billion in the net investment income bal- 
ance since  1980. 
The  continued deterioration of the investment income 
balance is inevitable, particularly in an environment in 
which the current account is likely to move only gradu- 
ally toward balance. Indeed, at current rates of return 
Table  1 
Breakdown of U.S. Current Account Balance 
(Billions of  Dollars) 
1980  1983  1985  1987  1988 
Current account balance  —46.3  —115.1 
Merchandise trade balance  —67.1  —122.1 
Net investment  income  24.9  25.9 
Transfers  and other services  —4.0  —18.9 
Memo: U.S. net foreign asset position 
Level  106.3  89.4  —110.7  —368.2  —487.1 
Share of GNP  3.9  2.6  —2.8  —8.1  —9.9 
Source: Department  of Commerce 
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(1) CAD = 
(2) CAD = 
(3) CAD = 
(M — X) + lip 
DD — GNP 












—11.4 the U.S. factor income balance  will almost certainly 
move into deficit in the coming years.2 As a result, the 
external adjustment burden will be placed entirely on 
the "primary" trade balance — the merchandise trade 
balance  plus  net transfers and other nonfactor ser- 
vices. More specifically, it is likely that the U.S. mer- 
chandise trade  balance, which has been, in deficit since 
1975,  will need to be  balanced eventually, simply to 
stabilize the current account deficit in relation to GNR 
The necessary adjustment in the U.S. trade position 
represents, at the macroeconomic level, a large trans- 
fer of real resources to foreign countries. The pattern 
of production in the United States must be shifted away 
from  satisfying domestic needs and towards the export 
sector. Consequently, the adjustment process will limit 
the growth of domestic purchases of goods and ser- 
vices. As identity 2 indicates, real  domestic demand 
growth is determined by two factors during the adjust- 
ment process  — the growth path of output (GNP) and 
the initial size of the external imbalance, reflected by 
the gap between demand and output. 
Most recent studies that have examined U.S. growth 
performance suggest that the economy's real potential 
growth rate—the  maximum rate at whi:ch growth can 
be sustained while maintaining stable rates of inflation 
—currently stands between 2.5 percent and 3 percent 
2Estimates  based on our simulation model suggest that at current 
interest rates and net debt levels,  the U.S. investment  income 
balance will move into deficit by 1990 and steadily deteriorate 
through the first half  of  the next decade, even in an environment  of 
declining current account deficits. 
Table 2 
annually.3 Using this as a target for output growth 
allows us to determine the noninflationary growth rate 
of domestic demand that is consistent with eliminating 
the current account deficit.  For example, if the U.S. 
economy were to sustain real GNP growth at the rate 
of 2/4 percent per year over the next five years, 
domestic demand growth could grow at most by 21/4 
percent annually — one-half of one percentage  point 
slower than GNP—in order to eliminate the U.S. cur- 
rent account deficit during this period.4 
Domestic demand could, of course, grow more rap- 
idly during the adjustment  period if excess capacity 
existed in the economy. Indeed, this appears to have 
been the case in the United States since the beginning 
of 1986 (Table  2). Over the past  three years, the current 
account deficit has declined despite the continued 
growth in domestic demand at or above the U.S. poten- 
tial growth rate. This improvement  has been made pos- 
3Potential  growth is usually determined by identifying growth in an 
economy's productive resources together with the rate of advance in 
their productivity. See, for example, the following  recent studies: 
"Potential Output in the Major Industrial Countries," Staff Studies for 
the World Economic Outlook, International  Monetary  Fund, August, 
1987; Robert J. Gordon, "Unemployment  and Potential  Output in the 
1980s," Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity '2: 1984; and 
Douglas  W. Woodham,  "Potential Output Growth and the Long-Term 
Inflation Outlook," this Quarterly Review, vol. 9 (Summer  1984). 
41n real terms the current account deficit represented  roughly 2'/2 
percent of GNP in 1988. To appreciate how the size of  our initial 
external imbalance affects the  ability of demand to expand, note that 
if  the current account deficit were half its current size (11/4 percent of 
GNP), domestic demand could expand at 2'/2  percent per year over 
the next five years while achieving external  adjustment. 
Recent  Trends in U.S. Economic  Activity 
GNP growth (annualized percent change) 
Domestic demand (annualized percent change) 
Foreign domestic demand (annualized percent change)t 
Real effective exchange rate (annualized percent change) 
Current account as a share of  GNP 
Level (end of  period) 
Change over period (percentage points) 
Capacity utilization rate 
Level (end of  period) 
Change over period (percentage points) 
Unemployment  rate 
Level (end of period) 
Change over period (percentage points) 
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tWeighted average of  domesic demand growth in Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West  Germany. 
lReal trade-weighted  value of  the dollar against 14 industrial countries,  computed using dollar exchange rates deflated by the ratio of 
foreign to U.S. wholesale  prices. sible by drawing  on underutilized resources in the 
economy. Factor utilization rates have increased stead- 
ily since  1981, allowing GNP to expand above its full 
capacity growth rate of 2'12 to 3 percent. 
Capacity  utilization  rates and unemployment rates 
have, however, reached levels suggesting that attempts 
to sustain current growth rates will likely fuel inflation- 
ary pressures.5  Thus, even if full employment  growth is 
maintained, a substantial slowing in domestic demand, 
relative to both its recent.  trend and output growth, 
appears necessary if the economy  is to follow an 
adjustment path that does not lead to an acceleration 
in inflation. 
An examination of recent trends in U.S. savings and 
investment balances provides further  insight  into the 
likely nature of  the adjustment process (Table  3). These 
balances, presented as a share  of GNP,  indicate the 
importance of a decline in the national savings rate in 
the deterioration of the U.S. external balance  since 
1980. Over the course of this decade, net national sav- 
ings as a share  of GNP has fallen sharply from 5.1 
percent in 1980 to 2.8' percent in 1988.6 (This  rate is 
currently less than half that of any other major indus- 
trial nation.7) As a result, net investment demand has 
been increasingly financed  from abroad, with foreign 
sources accounting for at least half of U.S. net invest- 
ment in each of the past .three years. 
5For a detailed analysis of capacity constraints in the U.S. 
manufacturing  sector, see Spence Hilton, "Capacity Constraints  and 
the Prospects for External Adjustment and Economic Growth: 
1989-90,  in this issue of the Quarterly Review. 
6lt i  clear from Table 3 that much of  the deterioration of national 
savings between 1980 and 1986 was attributable to public sector 
borrowing tht  more than doubled as a share of  GNP. Since 1986 net 
national savings has risen as a decline in private savings has been 
more than offset by an increase in public savings. 
7The latest available OECD measures for 1987 indicate that net 
national savings as a share of GOP were as follows: Japan 18.4, 
Germany 11.4, France 7.0, the United Kingdom  5.4, Italy 10.0, 
Canada 7.2, and the United States 2.4. 
Table 3 
While external adjustment could, in principle, involve 
changes in either investment or savings rates, it is diffi- 
cult to conceive of a viable  adjustment path in which 
the  net national savings rate remained at its present 
level. Eliminating the U.S. current account deficit while 
maintaining  this savings  rate would imply a sharp 
reduction in net investment as a share  of GNP and, 
consequently, a slowing in the economy's capacity for 
growth.8  Thus, if adjustment is to occur without  eroding 
long-term prospects  for growth,  it must be accom- 
panied by a significant increase in national savings. 
Adjustment and policy actions 
The preceding discussion  suggests that three 
changes  in  economic activity will characterize any 
adjustment scenario consistent with stable inflation and 
unchanged capacity  growth  rates.  First,  in  order to 
achieve external adjustment, the U.S. trade deficit will 
need  to be virtually eliminated to offset the likely 
increase in debt service  payments in the coming years. 
Second,  domestic demand growth  — meaning  some 
combination of private consumption, government 
spending, and investment—will have to slow from its 
pace of recent years. Annual GNP growth of between 
21/2  and 3 percent (perhaps more safely estimated at 
21/2 percent) and domestic demand  growth  roughly 
one-half of one percentage point less than GNP repre- 
sent reasonable  standards for U.S. performance if 
external adjustment is to be realized without placing 
upward pressure on inflation. Finally, adjustment must 
be accompanied by a substantial increase in net 
national savings as a share of output to prevent a dete- 
rioration of U.S. growth prospects over the long term. 
°ln particular, a  decline in the net investment  rate to  below 3 percent 
(the current net savings rate) could lower the rate of capital 
accumulation by as much as 11/2 percent per year. The studies of 
U.S. productive capacity cited earlier would indicate that this 
slowdown in capital accumulation could reduce potential growth rates 
and, ultimately, U.S. living standards by three-tenths of  one 
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U.S. Savings and Investment Balances 
(As a Percent of GNP) 
1980  1984  1986  1987  1988e 
Net  investment  5.0  6.9 
Net national savings  5.1  4.1 
Private  6.4  6.8 
Public  —1.3  —2.8 
Current account balance  0.1  —2.8 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis These changes, which might be viewed as "neces- 
sary conditions"  for adjustment, limit the alternative 
adjustment paths available. Nonetheless, the preceding 
analysis is not sufficient to determine the effects or 
extent of adjustment on key macroeconomic variables. 
Shifts in policies (either here or abroad) as well as 
changes in behavior unrelated to policy could move the 
current account toward balance. The actual path that 
the economy follows will depend on the factors under- 
lying the adjustment process. 
We have  seen,  for example,  that the economy's 
potential growth rate plays an important role in deter- 
mining the maximum rates of expansion in demand and 
output  consistent with adjustment and nonaccelerating 
inflation. Many observers, however,  have argued  that 
as a result of measures necessary to bring about the 
changes described above, the economy will be unable 
to sustain  ful.l  employment growth  while undergoing 
adjustment and will suffer other economic disruptions. 
The  evidence of other industrial nations seems to pro- 
vide support for this view (Table 4). Over the past fif- 
teen  years,  industrial  nations have  generally 
experienced a slowdown in output and demand growth 
from long-term trends in the process of reducing large 
external deficits. 
Table 4 also illustrates the variation in the growth 
experiences  of other nations.  For example,  growth 
slowed quite considerably in Germany in the course of 
deficit  reduction, but  not at all in Canada. In recent 
U.S. experience, we have seen (Table 2) that the cur- 
rent account  deficit was reduced from 1986 onward 
while demand and output growth  proceeded along or 
above  long-term trends. This  performance,  largely 
attributable to the dollar's decline and increased for- 
eign expenditure growth, might suggest that the exter- 
nal imbalance could be alleviatedby measures that 
raise world demand for U.S. goods. 
Table 4 
However, the gains that  can be realized solely 
through a foreign demand stimulus or dollar deprecia- 
tion are likely to be limited. While these measures tend 
to improve the U.S. external deficit,  primarily through 
increased export  demand, they also raise total demand 
for U.S. domestic output. As we have seen, this mecha- 
nism can bring about adjustment  while reducing the 
gap between actual and potential output as long as the 
economy is below full employment. As capacity  con- 
straints are approached, however, continued reliance 
on measures to increase demand for U.S. goods  will 
likely reap diminishing  improvements in the current 
account  and  instead  fuel  near-term  inflationary 
pressures. 
This analysis does not exclude a role for exchange 
rate depreciation or stimulative foreign demand poli- 
cies. As we will see later, these measures may play an 
important complementary role in the adjustment pro- 
cess. Nevertheless, in an economy operating near  full 
capacity, measures that serve to slow domestic 
demand  growth will be central to the adjustment 
process. 
There are, however, significant risks  in  promoting 
adjustment by acting to slow demand. Contractions in 
demand, whether due to market forces or policy 
actions,  exert strong downward  pressure  on overall 
levels of economic activity. The effects on output 
growth from a negative demand shock may be partic- 
ularly  sizable in the case  of the United States, because 
a slowdown in the pace of domestic demand growth in 
the world's largest economy is likely to have a powerful 
effect on activity abroad. 
A prolonged downward shift in activity  may also have 
damaging effects through its impact on the  composition 
of demand.  Since  investment  is the component of 
demand most sensitive to fluctuations in output, a per- 
sistent slowing in activity  growth could lower the rate  of 
United Kingdom  1974-78 
Germany  1980-82 
France  1982-85 
Canada  1975-80 
Italy  1980-83 
tlrend  period is 1974  to 1987. 
4.6  1.2  1.7  0.4 
2.5  0.2  1.8  —1.2 
2.1  1.5  2.2  1.3 
2.3  3.7  3.4  3.4 
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External Adjustment and Rates of Activity  Growth in Other Industrial Countries 




As a  Share of GNP 
GNP  Domestic Demand 
Adjustment  Adjustment 
Period  (In Percentage  Points)  Period  Trendt  Period  Trendt capital accumulation and underlying growth capacity. 
At the same time, the government budget deficit gener- 
ally rises in an economic downturn, a development  that 
could exacerbate already significant budgetary prob- 
lems. Thus, the concern raised earlier, that adjustment 
will result from slowing  investment with little or  no 
changes forthcoming in national savings, is not unwar- 
ranted. Evidence of the potential significance of this 
concern is provided in Table 5. In other industrial econ- 
omies, current account adjustment  has been almost 
uniformly accompanied by declining government bud- 
get balances and  sharp reductions in net private 
investment rates. 
Domestic policy makers do have some control  over 
the composition of demand during adjustment. It may 
be possible, for example, to reduce a current account 
deficit by combining a fiscal contraction to slow 
demand  (and  raise national  savings) with monetary 
policy actions that allow  real interest rates to decline in 
order to promote investment demand. However,  the net 
impact of any such policy actions that promote external 
adjustment must clearly be to reduce domestic demand 
growth. Thus, to the extent that exchange rates and 
foreign demand growth are left unchanged, domestic 
policy makers  may be faced with a basic conflict 
between their  goals  of maintaining full employment and 
reducing external imbalances. 
These considerations suggest that a coordination of 
domestic and foreign policies may prove beneficial to 
the adjustment process. Coordination may not require 
active  measures  by policy makers abroad  since the 
dollar's real value would tend to fall as a result of a 
slowing in U.S.  demand growth and a decline in real 
interest rates. Nonetheless,  an  agreement  to allow 
some dollar depreciation and/or foreign demand stim- 
ulus to offset a contraction to domestic demand in the 
United States may help maintain the level of economic 
activity here and  abroad and improve the trade-offs 
facing U.S. policy makers. 
Analysis of possible adjustment paths 
We now turn from our general discussion to a more de- 
tailed analysis of potential external adjustment paths. 
To this end, we have developed a model incorporating 
the main determinants of U.S. macroeconomic perfor- 
mance and its external balance that allows us to com- 
pare a number of alternative adjustment scenarios. 
By projecting the path of key behavioral and policy 
parameters into the future, we simulate a "baseline" 
scenario for U.S. economic performance over 1989-97. 
Under this scenario  the current  account deficit 
increases from 1990 onward, reaching 31/2 percent of 
GNP in 1993 and 33/4 percent by 1997. We then con- 
sider three alternative scenarios that would  allow the 
Table 5 
External Adjustment and Shifts in Composition of Demand in Other Industrial Countries 
•  (Shares of GNP)  - 
.  Current  Net National  Budget  Net Private 




—4.0  5.1  —3.8  9.1 
:  1978  0.6  7.9  —4.4  7.3 
Change (percentage points)  4.6  2.8  —0.6  —1.8 
• 
Germany  . 
1980  —1.7  10.1  —2.9  u.S 
1982  0.8  7.7  —3.3  6.9 
Change (percentage points)  2.5  —2.4  —0.4  —4.9 
.  France  . 
1982  —2.2  7.3  —2.8  9.5 
•  1985  —0.1  7.1  —2.8  7.2 
Change (percentage points)  2.1  —0.2  0.0  —2.3 
Canada 
,  1975  —2.7  11.3  —2.5  14.0 
1980  —0.4  11.4  —2.8  11.8 
:  Change (percentage points)  2.3  0.1  —0.3  —2.2 
Italy 
1980  —2.2  14.1  —8.5  16.3 
1983  0.4  11.0  —10.7  10.6 
;  Change (percentage points)  2.6  —3.1  ..  —2.2  —5.7 
:  Source: OECD,  Department  of Economics and Statistics, National Accounts, vol. 2. 
-- --.---—-——.--  ——-———-.—-—-------.----. 
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1 percent of GNP by 1993. These scenarios describe 
adjustment under the following conditions: (1) market- 
induced changes in interest rates and the real value of 
the dollar arising from shifts in expectations about the 
dollar's long-run value or from increased risk premia on 
U.S. assets, (2) U.S. fiscal and monetary policy actions 
under unchanged market conditions, and (3) U.S. pOl- 
icy measures coordinated with the actions of foreign 
authorities. 
The alternatives to our baseline scenario are evalu- 
ated according  to their ability to achieve external 
adjustment concurrently with  three broad macro- 
economic objectives: the avoidance of upward pressure 
on the rate of inflation;9 full employment (sustaining 
output  at or close to potential); and the maintenance  of 
the economy's long-term growth prospects (adequate 
investment growth). Furthermore,  we evaluate  eco- 
nomic performance under each scenario through 1997 
in order to consider the sustainability of external 
adjustment and its implications for activity beyond the 
adjustment horizon. 
The mode! 
The model used  in the simulations  (described  in 
detail in the Appendix) has been designed to  capture in 
a simple way key macroeconomic  trade-offs associated 
with  adjustment. We account for the major  determi- 
nants of economic activity and the current account bal- 
ance in  the United States, focusing on the medium- 
term dynamics embodied in these relations. 
In our model, output is determined by the level of 
aggregate demand. Thus, any shock to demand will 
have a direct and immediate  impact on the pace of 
GNP growth. The  domestic component of demand con- 
sists of relations for private consumption, private 
investment, and government consumption. The private 
components of demand are related to levels of activity, 
the interest  rate, and private  sector wealth. Govern- 
ment spending,  including  federal, state, and  local 
authority expenditure, is an exogenously determined 
policy instrument,  modeled as a share of potential 
GNR 
The specification of the external component of 
demand consists of standard volume and price equa- 
tions for exports and imports of goods and services. 
Net investment income payments are  modeled sep- 
arately by applying a rate of return (calculated as an 
average of past values  of the U.S. nominal  interest 
rate) to the economy's net foreign asset position. The 
current  account balance reflects the sum of the bal- 
ances on net exports of goods and services and net 
criterion does not imply that maintaining inflation at its current 
rate is  itself a desirable policy goal. 
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investment incomes. Changes in the net foreign asset 
position of the economy are determined, in turn, by the 
current account balance. 
Although output is demand-determined, supply con- 
siderations play an important role in this model through 
their impact on inflation, interest rates, and private dis- 
posable income. The economy's full capacity level of 
output  is  based on a production function incorporating 
the capital stock (determined by  past investment 
trends), estimates of the underlying growth of the labor 
force,  and total factor productivity growth. The gap 
between actual output and this measure of full capacity 
is the principal determinant  of domestic  inflation.  In 
addition, net government  tax receipts are related to the 
output gap, serving to dampen movements in  house- 
hold income over the business cycle. 
The nominal interest rate, modeled as an average of 
short- and long-term yields, is assumed to be a policy 
instrument of the monetary authorities. Authorities are 
also assumed to know the inflation process  and to 
adjust the nominal interest rate in line with changes in 
inflationary expectations, thus  neutralizing the impact 
of inf'ation on the rea' interest rate. 
The real exchange rate (terms of trade)  is deter- 
mined by assuming  (1)  that there is perfect capital 
mobility internationally such that the expected rate of 
real dollar depreciation  equals the U.S.-foreign real 
interest differential  adjusted for risk (covered interest 
parity); and  (2) that the real value of the dollar is 
expected to return to its equilibrium  level (assumed 
unchanged) at a constant rate. The path of the nominal 
exchange rate is determined by the real exchange rate 
and  the U.S.-foreign  inflation differential. Although 
exchange rates are determihed within the model, other 
foreign variables —  foreign demand growth, prices, and 
interest rates  — follow exogenously determined paths. 
It should be emphasized that the results generated 
by the model are sensitive to both its general structure 
and the specific parameter values it embodies. Conse- 
quently, while precise numerical  paths for economic 
variables are  presented, these results must be inter- 
preted only as a general  representation  of how the 
economy  would  respond.  Nevertheless,  our experi- 
ments suggest that the qualitative nature of the results 
are robust with regard to small changes in the model 
parameterization. Thus, to the extent that the model 
reasonably represents the functioning of the economy, 
our analysis does provide a relevant basis for evaluat- 
ing the adjustment alternatives  and policy trade-offs 
facing the U.S. economy. 
The base!ine scenario 
The baseline  simulation combines  the model 
described above with projections for key (exogenous) economic conditions from 1989 to 1997.10 In particular, 
we project  that foreign domestic demand and foreign 
prices will grow by 3.25 and  3.5 percent per year 
respectively. U.S.  and foreign real interest  rates are 
assumed to be held constant at 3.5 and 2.8 percent 
respectively but are  equal  on a risk-adjusted  basis 
(there is a risk premium of 70 basis points on  U.S. 
assets). Thus, these assumptions are consistent with a 
stable real exchange rate over the forecast horizon. 
These projections, which apply  to all other  scenarios 
unless otherwise  stated,  should not be viewed as a 
forecast of actual future outcomes. Instead, they illus- 
trate one possible path that economic activity might fol- 
low if current trends were extended into the future. 
The outcome of the baseline scenario is summarized 
in Table 6 and Chart 1. We project an acceleration in 
domestic demand growth in 1989 and 1990 attributable 
to the lagged effects of rapid GNP growth. Combined 
10Historical values are used for all variables through 1987. The model's 
output for  1988 incorporates actual values, estimates, and model- 
generated projections. 
Table 6 
The Baseline  Simulation 1988-97 
(Average  Annual Percent  Change) 
1988  1989-93  1994-97 
GNP  3.6  2.5  2.4 
Domestic demand  2.6  2.6  2.5 
Private consumption  2.5  2.6  2.5 
Government 
consumption  0.2  2.6  2.7 
Investment  5.5  2.7  2.4 
Prices (GNP deflator)  4.6  6.1  5.2 
Real exchange ratet  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1988  1993  1997 
with  a slowdown in foreign  domestic demand growth 
from its earlier pace and a stable real value of the dol- 
lar, this acceleration leads to a deterioration in the U.S. 
current account that,  over  time, slows economic 
growth. On average, domestic demand grows by 2.6 
percent over 1989-93 and 2.5 percent during 1994-97; 
GNP grows by 2.5 percent and 2.4 percent per year 
during these periods. The current account deficit 
increases to roughly $250 billion by 1993 and reaches 
3.8 percent of GNP at the end of the projection period. 
The significance of rising debt service payments in 
these projections should be noted. Net investment 
income payments rise by 1.6 percent relative to GNP 
from 1989 to 1997 and account for all of the deteriora- 
tion in the current account over this period. This deteri- 
oration can be attributed to the rise in U.S. net foreign 
debt (which nearly triples in relation to GNP during this 
period), along with the increase in the nominal interest 
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Chart 1 
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—9.9 rate associated with a pickup in inflation. 
Scenarios leading to current account adjustment 
The baseline scenario traces one possible path of 
economic activity  into the future. A principal implication 
of this scenario is that external adjustment will end in 
1989 and the U.S. current account deficit will steadily 
rise during the 1990s. 
As an alternative to the baseline, we  now examine 
other scenarios that lead to a substantial reduction in 
the current  account deficit during the next five years. 
Specifically, we consider alternative paths in which the 
U.S. current account deficit is reduced to 1 percent of 
GNP by 1993. This criterion, while imposing rigid and 
somewhat arbitrary terms on the magnitude and timing 
of external adjustment, enables  us to examine  the 
implications of a significant medium-term improvement 
in the U.S. current account balance. Such an improve- 
ment would bring the current account deficit to a level 
that will likely  be sustainable  in an environment of 
roughly balanced trade flows  (excluding debt service 
payments).'1 
Market-induced adjustment 
The baseline scenario assumes that the projected 
increase in U.S. external imbalances will not substan- 
tially alter interest rates or other  financial market condi- 
tions. There is, however, considerable concern that in 
an environment of large and growing current account 
deficits, market-induced shocks will bring about exter- 
nal adjustment. Market-induced adjustment paths can 
arise from a number of factors, two of which we con- 
sider  here.  First, the deterioration of the current 
account projected in the baseline could  lead to a down- 
ward  revision in market expectations of the dollar's  long- 
run real value. Given the high degree of financial market 
integration  in the industrial world,  such a revision would 
likely  lower the dollar's  value immediately, unless U.S. inter- 
est rates  were to rise substantially relative to rates  abroad. 
Second,  foreign investors  might require  a higher 
return on U.S. assets in order to absorb the increased 
supply of dollar-denominated  debt that will likely 
accompany ongoing current account deficits. Concep- 
tually, these higher returns might be necessary to com- 
pensate investors for the additional risk (arising 
primarily from possible  fluctuations in the dollar's 
110n the basis of  the assumptions  for capacity growth rates and real 
interest rates that underlie the baseline  scenario, adjustmenl of  the 
U.S. current account deficit to 1 percent of GNP is sustainable  over 
the long run in an environment  in which the U.S. runs a small surplus 
in its external balance excluding net payments  on its foreign debt. 
For a more detailed exposition of the relationship  between current 
account and lrade balance sustainability. see Charles Pigott, 
Economic  Consequences  of  Continued U.S. External Deficits.'  in this 
issue of the Quarterly Review. 
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value) they bear in increasing the share of dollar- 
denominated assets in their portfolios.'2 Any increase 
in risk premia on dollar assets would  likely  result in 
some combination of a fall in the dollar's real value (at 
an unchanged long-run value) and an increase in the 
domestic real interest rate. 
Changes in exchange rate expectations and/or risk 
premia could reduce the current account deficit through 
the combined effects of a real dollar depreciation that 
shifts  world demand  towards U.S.  goods and an 
increase in the U.S.  real interest  rate that dampens 
domestic demand. It is difficult, however, to assess the 
potential magnitude of these exchange rate and inter- 
est rate  effects. Available evidence regarding the deter- 
minants of exchange rate expectations  and the 
importance of exchange  rate risk in relative asset 
yields is inconclusive. Moreover,  the real possibility of 
bandwagon effects or speculative bubbles arising from 
hard-to-predict investor psychology  cannot be 
assessed in any systematic way. Thus, in our analysis 
we consider a range of possible combinations of dollar 
depreciation and increases in the U.S. real interest rate 
that are consistent with  our adjustment criteria.  This 
approach  allows us to assess well-defined market- 
based adjustment scenarios,  but it must be empha- 
sized that these scenarios may not adequately repre- 
sent the actual market response to the conditions 
embodied in the baseline projections. 
Three possible market solutions that reduce the U.S. 
current account deficit to 1 percent of GNP by 1993 are 
presented in Table 7. In one case, market forces lower 
the real value of the dollar with only a small increase in 
the real interest rate.  In  another,  market forces raise 
the U.S.  real interest rate with only a mild decline in 
the real value of the dollar. Finally, a third scenario 
considers an adjustment path  involving  substantial 
changes in both the real value of the dollar and the 
real interest rate. 
These  scenarios  highlight the significant  potential 
risks to macroeconomic stability posed by a market- 
driven adjustment process. Although our current 
account target can be obtained largely through a fall in 
the real value of the dollar (a decline of nearly 13 per- 
cent cumulatively over 1989-93),  this fall leads to an 
overheating of the economy. GNP grows by nearly 4 per- 
cent per year during the adjustment period, a rate far 
exceeding the economy's potential growth rate. As a result, 
inflationary  pressures build rapidly, approaching a 9 per- 
cent rate by 1993 and rising above  11 percent  in 1997. 
More significantly, the analysis suggests that adjust- 
'2lhese  issues are addressed in considerably greater detail in 
Juann Rung, Charles Pigott, and Anthony Rodrigues.  "Financial 
Implications of  the U.S. External Deficit." in this issue of the 
Quarterly Review. 
-—--.,.——  ——  —.I——  -  —-  —  - -  —  — =_.T_-  -— - --  ———--- ment brought about by dollar depreciation alone is not 
sustainable. The  increased pace of activity arising from 
the dollar's decline supports domestic demand growth 
well beyond the adjustment period. Domestic demand 
grows at an average rate of nearly 3 percent per year 
over 1994-9.7 under this scenario, roughly one-half of 
one percentage point above the rate projected in the 
baseline scenario. In addition, debt service payments 
rise sharply due  to an acceleration in inflation  that 
drives up the nominal interest rate to a level exceeding 
16 percent in  1997. The combined  effects of rapid 
demand  growth  and rising debt service completely 
reverse the earlier adjustment. The U.S.  current 
account  deficit increases  by 11/2  percent relative to 
GNP over the years 1994-97,  and by 1997 the deficit 
has nearly returned to its 1988 share of GNP. 
An adjustment process  resulting  from market- 
induced shocks that primarily raise the U.S. real inter- 
est rate presents a very different  economic scenario. 
The substantial increase in the U.S. real interest rate 
(four percentage points above the baseline level) 
reduces the current  account  deficit at the cost of a 
sharp slowdown in domestic demand growth, to 1  per- 
cent per year over 1989-93.' As a result, GNP grows 
131t should be noted that domestic demand growth recovers over 
1994-97.  However, for the period 1989-97 as a whole, demand growth 
is still considerably slower than that projected in the baseline, by 
over two and a half percentage points cumulatively. 
only  1.6  percent annually,  a full percentage  point 
slower than its pace in the baseline. 
The impact of the rise in the real  interest  rate is 
transmitted primarily through investment demand. 
Investment contracts at an annual rate of 2.4 percent 
over the adjustment period. This severe slowdown in 
investment, cumulatively about twenty percentage 
points  below  baseline  projections,  lowers  the econ- 
omy's potential growth  rate to 2.2 percent by 1993. 
Despite a declining  potential  growth  rate, there is a 
buildup of excess capacity in the economy that largely 
accounts for the considerable fall in inflation and 
increase in the government budget deficit projected in 
this scenario. 
These scenarios indicate how market-induced move- 
ments in the real exchange rate or the real interest rate 
might individually  affect the U.S. economy. However, 
financial market shocks could  have a significant impact 
on both variables. Thus, the implications of a market 
adjustment  scenario,  characterized  by a substantial 
increase in the real interest rate and a decline in the 
real value of the dollar, are presented in the right hand 
columns of Table 714 
Despite maintaining full employment  growth, this sce- 
nario does not provide an attractive adjustment alterna- 
14Note that we have  specifically designed this scenario to evaluate  a 
market-based alternative in which the economy  adjusts while 
maintaining output growth close to  its long-term trend. 
Current account (as a percent of GNP) 
Net investment  income (as a  percent of  GNP) 
Budget balance (as a percent of GNP) 
Potential  output 
Prices (GNP deflator) 
Nominal interest rate (level) 
Real interest rate (level) 
Net foreign assets (as a  percent of  GNP) 
Large Real Exchange 
Rate Depreciation 
1989-93  1994-97 
Large Increase in 
the U.S. Real 
Interest Rate 
1989-93  1994-97 
Exchange  Rate 
Depreciation and Rise in 
the Real  Interest Rate 
1989-93  1994-97 
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Table  7 
Possible Market-Induced  Adjustment Paths 
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—-—..  ——-..-- tive. In fact, it incorporates undesirable characteristics 
of the other market adjustment scenarios. The current 
account  improvement  achieved when market forces 
significantly affect both the interest rate and  the 
exchange rate is unsustainable. In addition, as a result 
of the weak investment performance during the adjust- 
ment  period, the economy's potential growth rate 
declines. 
By the end of our projection horizon in 1997, the U.S. 
current account deficit as a share of GNP stands only 
one-half of one percentage point below its 1988 level 
under this scenario. But a substantial price is paid for 
even this modest decline in the current account: nomi- 
nal and  real  interest  rates are higher, inflation has 
increased, and both net foreign debt and net interest 
payments  are well  above their 1988 levels in relation to 
GN  P. 
Before proceeding, we again caution that emphasis 
should not be  placed on specific model  estimates. 
Instead, identifying the broad contours of differing mar- 
ket scenarios and highlighting the tendency for market 
mechanisms to generate disruptive and unsustainable 
adjustment paths are of key importance. In addition, we 
note that the potential risks of market-induced adjust- 
ment mechanisms could be considerably larger than 
the ones depicted in  these scenarios. Any path that 
generates a sharp acceleration in  inflation or a sub- 
stantial and persistent slowing in output (or both) runs 
an additional risk of precipitating other disruptions  in 
the economy (for example, a disruption of financial or 
credit markets) that could significantly worsen the eco- 
nomic consequences of a scenario of this type. 
U.S. policy-led  adjustment 
The  market adjustment scenarios, while by no means 
inevitable, point to a set of forces that could reduce the 
U.S. current account deficit. We now examine adjust- 
ment paths generated by U.S. fiscal and monetary pol- 
icy actions. It is often  argued that  active  policy 
measures promoting adjustment are needed at least in 
part to avoid the economic costs embodied in potential 
market solutions. Thus, it is important to compare the 
possible outcomes of policy-led adjustment scenarios 
with those arising from market forces. 
In seeking to reduce the current account deficit, U.S. 
authorities are somewhat constrained  in their policy 
choices. In particular, our analysis suggests that U.S. 
monetary authorities, acting in isolation, cannot gener- 
ate a feasible external  adjustment path. Although  a 
monetary contraction—defined as measures that raise 
the U.S. real  interest  rate—can  reduce the current 
account deficit, the net improvement is  small because it 
is  limited  by the appreciation  of the dollar and the 
increase in debt service payments that are associated 
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with rising interest rates. Consequently, the slowdown 
in growth and investment demand necessary to 
achieve adjustment through a monetary contraction is 
so  large that  it cannot be considered a realistic 
alternative.'5 
Thus, actions by fiscal authorities to slow domestic 
demand must be a necessary component of any policy 
measures  geared  toward  reducing the U.S. current 
account deficit. Two possible scenarios of this type are 
presented in Table 8. The first combines a decline in 
government spending with monetary policy actions that 
leave the domestic real interest rate  and the real value 
of the dollar unchanged. In the second case, a decline 
in government spending is accompanied by monetary 
policy actions that allow the real interest rate and the 
real value of the dollar to decline. 
When the real  interest rate and the real exchange 
rate remain  unchanged, a fiscal contraction  signifi- 
cantly slows overall activity growth during the adjust- 
ment period. GNP growth declines to 1.9 percent per 
year during 1989-93, more than one-half  percentage 
point slower than in the baseline scenario; domestic 
demand growth of 1.5  percent annually represents a 
slowdown  of more than a full percentage point from  the 
baseline.  Growth rates of consumption  and private 
investment fall by roughly one percentage  point per 
year from their respective baseline projections as the 
decline in government expenditures extends to all com- 
ponents of demand. 
It is  clear that a more favorable trade-off between 
adjustment and growth can be engineered when policy 
makers allow the real interest rate  and the real value of 
the dollar to decline. In particular, adjustment in this 
scenario is consistent with maintaining output close to 
full employment. Indeed, annual  GNP growth  of 2.6 
percent actually exceeds that projected in the baseline 
scenario over 1989-93. In addition, consumption growth 
does not appreciably slow  over the adjustment period, 
and investment growth is over one percentage point 
faster per year than in the baseline projections. 
When viewed together with other characteristics of 
this adjustment path — stable inflation (although admit- 
tedly  still high), a relatively mild real depreciation of  the 
dollar (about 5 percent cumulatively), and an increase 
in  productive  capacity  relative  to the baseline—the 
combination of a fiscal contraction  with policies that 
reduce the real interest rate and the real value of the 
'5lhis conclusion would remain  unchanged even if  monetary authorities 
were able to maintain the dollars value as they tightened policy. The 
economic consequences  of such a scenario would be similar to 
those of the market-induced  rise in the U.S. real interest rate 
discussed above. In addition, since the real effects of monetary 
policy actions are generally  thought to dissipate over time, it is  not 
clear that monetary policy offers a mechanism  to achieve a sustained 
adjustment  of the external balance. dollar presents  an attractive adjustment  scenario.16 
Nevertheless, this scenario  has one potential  draw- 
back. The necessary contraction in fiscal policy is 
large. The discretionary  shift in fiscal policy—policy 
changes unrelated  to business cycle fluctuations  or 
changes in interest rates—amounts to more than $160 
billion or roughly 31/2 percent of potential GNR (In com- 
parison, a discretionary shift of about  21/2  percent of 
GNP is required in the scenario in which the interest 
rate and  exchange rate remain  unchanged.17) Real 
government spending on goods and services, exclud- 
ing transfer payments and debt service, must decline 
by more than 1  percent per year in order to achieve 
adjustment in this scenario. Overall, the general gov- 
ernment budget balance  rises from —1.8 percent of 
'6The importance of aflowing the real value of  the dollar to decline 
under this scenario needs to be emphasized. By providing a boost to 
U.S. demand that arises from the external sector, the tall in the 
dollar's value both supports activity  growth and promotes external 
adjustment. Our estimates indicate that economic activity would slow 
(by about three-tenths of one percentage point per year during 
1989-93 to about 21/4 percent) ii these policy  actions took place in an 
environment  of stable real dollar  values. 
17The larger contraction in fiscal policy required when the interest rate 
and the dollar  decline can be seen as necessary to  provide 
additional savings to  finance the more rapid investment  demand 
growth in this scenario. 
GNP in 1988 to +2.6 percent in 1993.18 
These considerations aside, the policy-oriented 
adjustment scenarios present a preferable alternative 
to those arising from market forces. Unlike the market 
adjustment scenarios,  policy actions can generate a 
current  account  improvement that will be  sustained 
beyond the adjustment  horizon.  In addition,  market- 
induced paths, while quite varied in their possible out- 
comes,  appear to promote  adjustment only at the 
expense of macroeconomic stability. A market-induced 
decline in the real value of the dollar fuels inflationary 
pressures while forces that  increase the real interest 
rate lower investment and overall activity growth 
significantly. 
Furthermore, a comparison of Tables 7 and 8 reveals 
that market adjustment scenarios involve a larger  slow- 
down in domestic  demand  growth  relative to output 
than their policy-led counterparts.  Domestic demand 
increases at an annual rate that is  six-tenths to seven- 
tenths of one percentage  point slower than output 
under the market adjustment  scenarios;  this gap  is 
18A more balanced contraction in fiscal policy in which personal taxes 
were increased would enable government spending to grow more 
rapidly because some of  the burden of  adjustment would fall on 
private consumption growth. However, the  overall size of  the fiscal 
contraction would be larger than 31/2 percent of potential GNP since 
changes in tax policy  have a smaller effect on domestic demand 
than direct changes in public sector spending. 
Current account (as a percent of GNP) 
Net investment  income (as a percent of GNP) 
Budget balance (as a  percent of  GNP) 
Potentiaf  output 
Prices 
Nominal  interest rate  (level) 
Real interest rate (level) 
Net foreign assets (as a  percent of  GNP) 
t(  +) signifies depreciation. 
Fiscal Contraction with 
Unchanged Real Exchange  Rate 
and Real Interest Rate 
1989-93  1994-97 
\ 
Fiscal Contraction with a Decline 
in the Real  Exchange  Rate and in 
the Real Interest Rate 
1989-93  1994-97 
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Table 8 
U.S. Policy-Led  Adjustment Paths 
(Average  Annual Percent  Change) 
GNP  1.9  2.8  2.6  2.7 
Domestic demand  1.5  3.0  2.1  2.8 
Consumption  1.9  3.0  2.6  2.9 
Government  consumption  —0.2  2.6  —1.3  2.8 
Investment  1.7  3.3  4.0  2.7 
Real exchange ratet  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
































—12.3 four-tenths to five-tenths of one percentage point under 
the policy-oriented  scenarios examined. This greater 
relative decline in demand can be attributed to two 
characteristics of the market adjustment path—the 
large deterioration in U.S. terms of trade that results 
from the dollar's decline, and the sharp  rise  in debt 
service payments that is due to higher interest rates. 
Both of these factors increase the real resources that 
must be transferred  to foreign  countries  to achieve 
adjustment and thus are associated with a larger slow- 
ing in U.S. domestic demand relative to GNP. 
Thus, our analysis indicates that a policy-managed 
external adjustment will likely  involve lower economic 
costs than one arising from market forces.  Although 
our policy-induced adjustment scenarios entail, at the 
least, a sharp slowing in domestic demand growth and 
a substantial tightening of fiscal policy in the coming 
years, they produce a more sustained and much more 
orderly  path  towards improvement  in  the current 
account  than  market  mechanisms  are  likely to 
generate. 
In this context, the importance of taking timely policy 
actions needs to be emphasized. Delaying action will 
almost certainly increase pressures in financial  mar- 
kets for the types of reactions discussed earlier. Admit- 
tedly, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these 
pressures will actually affect interest rates or the dollar. 
However,  even a modest rise in U.S. real interest rates 
would raise the real costs of adjustment, increase 
financial  market  instability,  and, over the long-term, 
have a significant adverse effect on U.S. economic 
performance. 
If financial market conditions remain unchanged, the 
economic costs of external adjustment are still likely to 
become more severe the longer  imbalances are 
allowed to persist. The adverse effects of the current 
account deficit on the economy's traded goods sector 
may, over time, lead to underlying structural shifts  in 
the economy.  As a result, a hysteresis may arise, such 
that the macroeconomic  adjustments needed to restore 
trade balance increase the longer they are postponed. 
In addition, the accumulation of U.S. external debt that 
accompanies persistent  current  account  deficits will 
increase debt service  payments and thus the overall 
transfer  of real  resources that will be required when 
adjustment occurs. 
The costs  of delaying adjustment  that stem from 
higher debt burdens can be assessed  within the frame- 
work  of our model. In the absence of measures promot- 
ing adjustment, the current account deficit rises rapidly 
in our baseline scenario, and by 1993 net debt service 
payments  are roughly twice as large as those projected 
under scenarios (Table 8) in which policy measures are 
taken immediately. As a result of these factors, U.S. 
28  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Winter-Spring  1989 
economic performance worsens if policy makers 
decide, for example, to wait until 1993 to take action to 
reduce the current account deficit to 1 percent of GNP 
by 1997. In particular, real output and demand grow by 
between two to three percentage points less over the 
1989-97 projection horizon and greater fiscal tightening 
is required than in  scenarios in which policy actions 
are taken immediately.19 
The role of  policy coordination 
In examining medium-term scenarios of current 
account  adjustment,  we  have assumed that foreign 
economic conditions are unaffected by changes in U.S. 
activity. Recognizing that much recent discussion has 
focused on the increased interdependence  of the world 
economy and the importance  of international  policy 
coordination, we  now consider how foreign and  U.S. 
policy makers, acting in concert,  might affect adjust- 
ment paths. 
Two scenarios, designed to provide a coordination 
alternative to the policy-led adjustment simulations dis- 
cussed in the previous section,  are  presented in 
Table  9. In both scenarios, foreign policy makers pro- 
vide  a temporary  stimulus to growth  abroad at the 
same time that U.S. fiscal  policy contracts.2°  This coor- 
dination of demand  policies  is evaluated  under two 
alternative  monetary policy rules: (1) authorities here 
and abroad set monetary policy to hold real interest 
rates and the real value of the dollar unchanged; and 
(2) authorities allow the U.S.  real  interest rate to 
decline and foreign real interest rates to rise, thus tow- 
ering the real value of the dollar. 
A comparison of Tables 8 and 9 indicates that there 
are potential gains from coordinating policies over the 
adjustment period. A temporary expansion in foreign 
growth provides a boost to U.S. activity while promot- 
ing external adjustment. As a result, a foreign stimulus 
helps cushion the effects of a U.S. fiscal contraction on 
output and demand growth. In the scenario involving 
unchanged real interest rates, real GNP and domestic 
demand can each grow three-tenths of one percentage 
point faster  per year  over 1989-93  when foreign 
demand growth temporarily rises. 
In the scenario in which interest rates are allowed to 
change, the output gains from coordination are small. 
lCThjs conclusion is based on a  comparison of the economy's 
performance over 1989.97 under two types of scenarios:  1) fiscal and 
monetary policy actions, delayed until 1993, work towards reducing 
the U.S. current account deficit to 1 percent of  GNP by  1997; and 2) 
fiscal and monetary policy authorities take immediate  action in 1989 
to reach the same current account target by 1993. 
The expansion in foreign activity under these scenarios is assumed 
to raise foreign demand growth by one percentage point above the 
baseline projections in 1989 and 1990. This result can  largely be attributed to the policy 
design, which specifies that monetary authorities main- 
tain output growth at a rate consistent with the econ- 
omy's potential. However,  by raising demand for U.S. 
exports, a foreign demand stimulus reduces the size of 
other measures  required to bring about  adjustment. 
The fall in the real value of the dollar amounts to less 
than  3'/2 percent  in  this  scenario,  compared with  a 
decline of over 5 percent when U.S. authorities act on 
their own. At the same time, the required discretionary 
cuts in government spending amount to 3 percent of 
trend GNP when policies are coordinated, about one- 
half of one percentage point less than the contraction 
required when U.S. authorities act on their own. 
These comparisons are, of course, sensitive to the 
particular coordination scenario  presented. Moreover, 
since we do not fully account for international linkages 
in our model, this exercise is limited  in its ability to 
capture the impact of policy coordination fully.21 How- 
ever, the analysis does highlight the potential improve- 
ments in U.S. economic  performance that might be 
realized if foreign demand policies serve to dampen 
the contractionary effects of U.S. policy actions during 
adjustment. In particular, if authorities wish to stabilize 
exchange rates over the adjustment period, an acceler- 
211n addition, no attempt is made to measure the effects or desirability 
of coordination  from the  viewpoint of foreign economies. 
Table 9 
ation in foreign growth  coordinated with U.S. fiscal 
tightening can reduce the cost to the U.S. economy in 
terms of lost output and demand. At the same time, if 
authorities attempt to maintain output along its long- 
term path, the coordination of policies here and abroad 
can allow for more flexibility on the part of U.S. policy 
makers in achieving other macroeconomic  objectives. 
Conclusion 
It is reasonably clear that significant changes in U.S. 
economic  activity will be required to achieve a sus- 
tained reduction of the large external imbalances that 
have accumulated  in  recent years.  In particular,  an 
assessment of recent economic trends suggests that 
the virtual  elimination of the  U.S.  merchandise trade 
balance,  a substantial  slowing  in domestic  demand 
growth, and an increase in the national savings rate 
will all accompany adjustment paths that do not endan- 
ger overall macroeconomic stability. 
The U.S. current account deficit can be reduced in a 
variety of ways, however, and the actual path of eco- 
nomic activity  in the coming years depends crucially on 
the actions of policy makers here and abroad as well 
as those of private agents. Using a simulation model of 
the U.S. economy, we  have projected  different  sce- 
narios offering a range of possible adjustment paths. 
Although  these  projections  are  only  illustrative  and 
cannot precisely represent the alternatives facing the 
Current account (as a  percent of  GNP) 
Net investment  income (as a percent of  GNP) 
Budget balance (as a percent of  GNP) 
Potential output 
Prices 
Reel interest rate (level) 
Net foreign assets (as a percent of GNP) 
Fiscal Policy Coordination  with 
Unchanged Real Exchange  Rate 
and Real Interest Rate 
1994-97 
Fiscal Poltcy  Coordination with a 
Decline in the Real Exchange  Rate 
and in the Real  Interest Rate 
1989-93  1994-97 
t(  •t-) signifies depreciation. 
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Adjustment Scenarios  with International Policy Coordination 
(Average  Annual Percent Cflange) 
1989-93 
GNP  2.2  2.7  2.6  2.8 
Domestic  demand  1.8  2.9  2.2  2.8 
Private consumption  2.2  2.9  2.6  2.8 
Government  consumption  0.2  2.7  —0.7  2.8 
Investment  2.2  2.9  3.6  2.8 
Foreign domestic demand  3.7  3.3  3.7  3.3 
Real exchange ratet  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0 




























—12.2 U.S. economy, they  nevertheless provide  a relevant 
basis for comparing different adjustment mechanisms. 
The results of this  analysis strongly suggest  that 
there are significant risks in failing to take timely action 
to reduce the U.S. current account deficit. At the least, 
postponing the adjustment process until the mid-1990s 
will lead to a more substantial slowdown in output and 
demand growth over the next decade than is likely to 
occur if actions promoting adjustment are taken imme- 
diately. Moreover,  inaction on the part of policy makers 
could  risk market-induced shocks that would reduce 
the current account deficit only at the cost of a signifi- 
cant disruption in U.S. activity. 
In contrast, an appropriate mix of U.S. monetary and 
fiscal actions can generate an adjustment path consis- 
tent with other major macroeconomic policy objectives. 
Although domestic demand growth will be required to 
slow to close to 2 percent per year, the combination of 
a fiscal contraction and proper monetary policy actions 
can produce a substantial  current  account  improve- 
ment while maintaining full employment, avoiding 
upward pressure on price inflation, and preserving the 
economy's long-term growth prospects. 
Our analysis further indicates that the  coordination of 
domestic and foreign policy actions along the adjust- 
ment path can improve the trade-offs facing the U.S. 
economy. A stimulus to foreign domestic demand in 
conjunction with contractionary policies in the U.S. 
would allow for faster output growth and would reduce 
the magnitude of U.S. policy changes required during 
adjustment. Thus,  coordinated policy measures  by 
authorities here and abroad  may offer the greatest 
potential for reducing the U.S.  current account while 




Appendix: A Model of the U.S. Economy 
This appendix presents the  equations that make up 
our model of the U.S.  economy. The behavioral equa- 
tions  are based on  specifications standard in the empir- 
ical literature.t The short-term dynamic properties of 
these relations have, however,  been simplified, reflect- 
ing our focus  on the  medium-term properties  of the 
simulations. 
The model can  be broken down into three  sectors: 
aggregate demand, aggregate supply and wealth accu- 
mulation, and  a  price sector.  All variables are 
expressed in constant 1982 dollars unless otherwise 
stated, and the intercept term in each equation (a) is set 
such that the model generates projections correspond- 
ing to actual values for 1988. 
Aggregate demand 
Aggregate demand,  the sum of domestic demand,  DD, 
and net exports, (X — M), equals output, V. 
(1) Vt = DD + (X1 — Mj. 
Domestic  demand is the sum of consumption,  C, pri- 
tThe basic structural.propertias of  our model are similar (albeit 
at a  considerably higher level of aggregation and with less 
detailed short-term  dynamics) to the properties of  the U.S. 
component of  the multicountry model developed by  the 
Federal Reserve Board. For a more detailed description of the 
multicountry model, see Hall Edison,  Jaime Marquez and 
Ralph Tryon, 'The Structure  and Properties  of the FRB 
Multicountry Model,' Pt. 1, 'Model Description  and Simulation 
Results,' International Finance  Discussion  Papers, no. 293, 
October 1986. 
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vate investment, I, and government spending on 
goods and services, G. 
Private consumption is a function of disposable 
income, YD,  private wealth, W, and the real interest 
rate,  r: 
(2) In C =  O.8InYD1 + 0.2InYD.2 + 0.03InW11 
— O.O02r.1. 
Private investment  demand is a  function of  the capital 
output ratio, (K/Y), the real interest rate, and the rate of 
output growth: 
(3) In I, =  + 1.O9(InY1  — InY2) 
+ .79(InY2 — InY3) — 1.20[InK1 — InY1] 
+ InKM — O.O4r1. 
By assumption, government spending on goods and 
services is maintained as a constant fraction of poten- 
tial output, Y: 
(4) G = 0.197Y1. 
Net tax receipts (including net transfers) of the gov- 
ernment, T, are the sum of net business tax receipts, 
TB, and net household tax receipts, TH: 
(5) T = TB + TH1. 
Business tax receipts are assumed equal to a con- 
stant share of output.  Net household tax receipts are Appendix: A Model of the U.S. Economy (continued) 
made up of two components: one assumed equal to a 
conêtant share of output and the second depending 
on the output gap: 
(6) TH1 = 0.043Y1 + 20(InY1 — InY). 
The public sector deficit, expressed in current dollars, 
equals government  expenditures on goods and services 
plus net government  interest payments on the stock  of 
public debt, PD, less net tax receipts: 
(7) D1 = P1G1 + iPD1 — 
where i  is an average interest rate based on current 
and lagged values, and P is the GNP deflator  4 
Disposable income is equal to personal income (V — 
H) less household  taxes. The difference between output 
and personal income, H, is assumed to  remain constant 
as a share of  output: 
(8) YD = (V1 — H1) — TH1. 
Exports, X, consist of exports of goods and services 
excluding factor income receipts. They are an increas- 
ing function of foreign domestic demand, DDF, and a 
decreasing function of the price of exports, px, relative 
to foreign prices, PF, expressed in dollar  terms: 
(9) InX =  2.OIn DDF11 — 1  .3[!nP1  — (InE11 
+ PF11)], 
where E equals the exchange rate (dollars per foreign 
currency), and foreign domestic demand  and foreign 
prices are assumed to follow exogenously given paths. 
Imports, M, consist of imports of goods and services 
excluding factor income payments.  They are an increas- 
ing function of  domestic demand and a decreasing  func- 
tion of the dollar price of imports, pm, relative to 
domestic prices: 
(10) mM1 =  2.2InDD11 — 1.4(InP1 — 
The current account, in current dollars, consists of net 
exports of goods and services plus net investment 
income payments, NIl: 
(11) CA1 = PX1 — PM1 + Nil1. 
Net investment income payments in current dollars 
*ln order  to determine the nominal budget  deficit in 1988, real 
government  spending and real net  tax receipts are converted 
into current dollars using their respective price deflators. 
However, during the projection period, price deflators for  these 
variables are assumed to move  with the GNP deflator. 
are  assumed to be a function of  the stock of net foreign 
assets and a rate of return of 1*: 
(12)  ND1  = E5 + it*NFAti, 
where €5 is an adjustment factor intended to account 
for differences in the rates of return on foreign and 
domestic asset holdings. 
Aggregate supply and wealth accumulation 
Potential output, P, depends upon the full capacity 
supplies of labor, N, capital, K, and total factor 
productivity, t. Beginning with the assumption that U.S. 
GNP was equal  to potential during 1987, we project 
the path of potential based on rates of capital 
accumulation and an assumed growth rate of the labor 
force of  11/2 percent per year. Total factor productivity 
is assumed to follow a stable time trend: 
(13) In Y' = 6 + O.75/nN1  + 0.25/nK1 + 0.009t. 
The capital stock is a function of the level of invest- 
ment. It depreciates at a constant rate: 
(14)  K1 = 0.925K1  + I. 
Private wealth is the sum of the public sector debt, 
PD, the capital stock, K, and net foreign assets, NFA: 
(15) W = PD1/P1 + K1 + NFAI/P. 
The stock  of public debt  changes in line with  the pub- 
lic sector deficit: 
(16)  PD1  = PD1 + D1. 
The net foreign asset position of the economy 
expressed  in current dollars is an increasing function of 
the current account surplus: 
(17)  NFA1 = €. + NFA11  + CA1, 
where e  is  an adjustment factor included to account for 
divergences between changes in the stock of net for- 
eign assets and the current account balance. 
Prices, interest rates, exchange rates 
Price inflation in the GNP deflator is determined by the 
output gap, past price changes, and changes in import 
prices, pm: 
(18) In Pt  =  InP11 + 0.6(InY11 — InY1) 
+ 0.3(InP1.1 — lnP12) 
+ 0.12(InP1  — InP2). 
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Export prices are a function of domestic prices and  ence between domestic real interest rates and foreign 
prices of  foreign goods expressed in dollar  terms:  real interest rates, rf, is equal to the expectations of 
dollar depreciation plus the risk premia, z, on holding 
(19) In P1 = e + 0.7lnP.1 + 0.3(InE1  + InPF1).  dollar  assets: 
Dollar import prices are a function of foreign prices,  (22) r  — rf = 100[InER+1 — InERJ + ;, 
expressed in dollar terms, and domestic prices: 
and (2) the real exchange rate returns to its equilibrium 
(20) In Pc" =  0.7(InPF.1 + 1nE.1)  level, ,  at a constant rate: 
+ 0.3(InP.1). 
(23) InER11 — InERt = 0.33(InER — InERJ. 
The nominal interest rate, i, is determined by  mone- 
tary authorities. The real interest rate, r, is equal to the  Combining (22) and (23) yields: 
nominal  interest  rate minus inflationary  expectations 
that are assumed to be equal to the  lagged inflation  (24) InERt = Infi  — 0.033 (r  — rf1 — zj. 
rate: 
The nominal exchange  rate is  calculated from the real 
(21) r = i  — 100(InP1 — InP2).  exchange rate and relative domestic and foreign price 
levels: 
The real exchange rate, ER, is determined by assum- 
ing (1) covered interest parity holds so that the differ-  (25) E = ER P/PF. 
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